![]() ![]() There were sound domestic and geopolitical reasons for this.ĭomestically, as in the First Emergency, its recurring tendency to shoot itself in the foot again played a part. The CPM’s eventual denouement was long in coming, actually. Chin Peng agreed to a peace treaty to formally end the Second Emergency a year later. By 1988, the jungle war had gone against the CPM and its underground network had collapsed. The Second Emergency gradually developed into a low-intensity campaign of subversion and counter-subversion in Singapore and sporadic jungle skirmishes in Malaysia. Such action included the high-profile assassination of Abdul Rahman Hashim, Inspector-General of the Malaysian Police. By 1968, the year of the politically and psychologically - if not tactically - successful Tet Offensive by Communist forces in South Vietnam, the CPM decided that the time was ripe to resume hostilities.īetween 19, CPM groups infiltrated back into Peninsular Malaysia and quietly re-established an underground support network 1974 then saw an upsurge in CPM terrorism, including assassinations, sabotage and bombings against government installations and personnel on both sides of the Causeway. It remained utterly determined to destroy both governments and establish a “Malayan People’s Republic” despite both countries having constitutionally-elected governments. Against this turbulent backdrop, the CPM was gradually gathering its resources for a renewed armed revolt against Singapore and Malaysia, which it regarded as not independent and sovereign states but British “neo-colonies”. ![]()
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